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BOOK REVIEWS
Though the validity of the reasoning in the above minority cases
might be unquestioned, the view in the majority of jurisdictions is
otherwise, the courts taking the view that if new rights are to be
created, it is the province of the legislature and not of the courts. See,
e. g., Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., supra, 50 N. W. (2d) at 231.
The instant case aligns itself with a distinct minority and conforms
to the modem trend. Once viability is proved, the minority will look
beyond the ancient precedents and bring the common law into the
framework of justice.
Robert C. Enburg
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PHILOSOPHY OF DEmOCRATIC GOVERNMENT. By Yves R. Simon.'
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951. Pp. ix, 324. $3.50.This book, written from the postulates of scholastic philosophy by a
professor of social thought at the University of Chicago, is the second
in the series of volumes issued by the Walgreen Foundation, "setting
forth the basic principles on which democracy rests." 2 In this volume,
Professor Simon, author of several important works on philosophy
and politics, and for ten years a professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, has stated in the abstract language of the philosopher, moral solutions of problems which have been historically precipitated in the spheres of the political, sociological and physical sciences.
In so doing, he has drawn freely from the works of the great philosophers, such as Aristotle, Aquinas, Suarez, Bellarmine and Maritain,
who have stbod for the existence of an objective natural law, and all
which that implies, including respect for the intrinsic worth and dignity
of the individual and the obligation of obedience to the- will of a
Personal Lawgiver. Their theories of the State and its proper sphere
have been brilliantly expounded and adapted to the distinctive problems
of contemporary technological society.
Professor Simon has presented his material in five chapters: General
Theory of Government, Democratic Freedom, Sovereignty in Democracy, Democratic Equality, and Democracy and Technology. He has
consolidated the contents of each chapter by the effective technique of
short summaries, which are of considerable aid to the reader. He has
included a concise and helpful index.
In the first chapter the author has shown the permanent necessity
of civil authority for the adequate organization of society, for the
1 Professor of Philosophy of Social Thought, University of Chicago.
2 Text at vii.
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selection of the proper objectives of its common good, and for the use
of those means which will best effectuate these objectives. It is true,
he has explained, that certain functions of civil authority, for instance,
the paternal, should be only temporary, since they flow not from that
which is permanent in human nature, but only from deficiencies, similar
to those found in an immature people who are under justifiable colonial
rule. The paternal function is only substitutional, since it is exercised
in the absence of a certain capacity in the persons involved. But the
essential function would be necessary, even in a community of ideally
constituted persons.
In the second chapter Professor Simon has demonstrated that there
can be no political system unless there are available institutions by
which the people may resist "bad" government. A political system is
not necessarily democratic. It becomes democratic only if the people
have, in addition to negative controls, an opportunity for the positive
assertion of their views and thus participate in the governing process.
The power exercised in a political system which is not democratic
is not necessarily evil. But experience shows the danger of potential
dictatorship when the people do not positively participate in the government.
The principle of universal suffrage evolved only slowly over the
centuries. It has become so embedded in the conscience of the 20th
century, however, that even dictators have hesitated to reject it. Rather,
they have paid lip service to it by holding farcical elections. In the
final analysis, this principle should not be regarded either with extreme
optimism or undue pessimism. No intrinsic wisdom or virtue attaches
to any particular part of the population. Each part is susceptible to
error of its own distinctive kind. In ordinary circumstances, the practice
of allowing each person only one vote, despite intellectual or moral
superiority, is desirable, since the common man can be adequately
protected in his right only by the allocation of power in his favor,
which results from following the equalitarian principle.
Democracy cannot exist with only one political party. The two party
system of the United States has proved to be the best in practice. The
multiple party system found in the countries on the Continent and
justified by the idea of proportional representation, is weak. Political
parties must be responsive to public opinion and must remain fluid.
As long as propaganda is free from unreasonable coercion, it is
legitimate. But coercion is justifiable only when persuasion fails. The
problem is rendered difficult because at times the line between coercion
and persuasion may not be accurately drawn. The State has coercive
authority, which is its most obvious role, insofar as it punishes evildoers.
Nevertheless, democracy prefers persuasion to coercion, and endeavors
to promote the domain of government by persuasion.
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In the third chapter Professor Simon has explained the "coach
driver theory" of sovereignty, advocated by Courier, and exposed its
limitations. This theory, which greatly influenced French but not
American political thinking, employs the analogy by which the leaders
of the State are likened to a coach driver, and the passengers to the
people. Such a theory would deny any real authority to these leaders
and invite anarchy. Even though civil authority need not be vested in
any distinct governing personnel, it must be in somebody.
The author has shown the error of the theory of the divine right of
kings stubbornly maintained by James I. According to this theory God
selects a specific person to be king and immediately confers civil authority upon him. This never happens in political society. It occurred
only once in the ecclesiastical sphere when Christ chose Peter as the
first Pope and conferred power upon him. But in the instances of
succeeding Popes, there is human designation of the particular person
who is to exercise papal authority.
The transmission theory postulates the transfer of civil authority
from the people, in whom God had reserved it, to the leader whom
the people have chosen. A unified expression of this theory has been
given by Cajetan, Bellarmine and Suarez. Professor Simon states: 3
The only point that might cause difficulty is whether the people have
the right not to transfer sovereignty to a distinct personnel. . . . the
theory that the people would always be under obligation to place powers
in the hands of a distinct personnel seems to be born of a misreading of
Bellarmine ....
Of the three, Suarez alone voices the theory that democracy comes into existence by nature as opposed to monarchy and aristocracy, which cannot come into existence except by positive disposition.

The expression, "government by the consent of the governed," may
be variously interpreted. It is indeed true if it means that political
association is an act of reason and will. But it is erroneous if it connotes
that the consent of individual persons is essential for the binding effect
of just law, for a law if just, binds the consciences of all in the community, whether they assent to it or not.
In the fourth chapter the author has discussed various aspects of
equality. The principle that all men are equal means that all persons
enjoy an equality of right insofar as they belong to the human race.
But it does not imply that all persons are equal in ability or that they
are entitled, for example, to an equality of education or wealth. The
legal order must reflect the essential preciousness of each human being.
The democratic revolution eliminated the servitude and serfdom
which prevailed in the period of feudalism when ruling orders, such as
the nobility, were in the ascendancy. Slavery had meant the complete
alienation of the work of slaves, who received only that which was
3 Id. at 175.
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necessary for the preservation of life, apart from the nature of the work
performed. The status of the workers was transformed into a condition
of contract. Bourgeois liberalism was sometimes guilty of injustice in
reference to the alienation of the services of the workers by tolerating
inequality of exchange as to work done and value received. The State
must reduce inequalities implicit in the succeeding contractual situation
by encouraging collective bargaining and by insuring the workers a just
return for their services.
In the fifth chapter Professor Simon has stated that technology is
desirable insofar as it makes possible man's domination of the physical
universe in accordance with the Biblical exhortation that man should
subdue the earth. 4 Technological development cannot be halted. Technology will inevitably go forward. But the use of technology and the
perfection of the machine have introduced new problems in contemporary society. These must be properly solved if democracy is to survive
and if the danger of Communism is to be avoided. Communism is exploiting the grievances of the proletariat, particularly in the large
industrial centers, and promoting the proletarian revolution in the
interests of the totalitarian State.
Technology leads to a minute division of labor and industrial activity. It derogates from the integration of personality which proceeds best
in a rural environment. It weakens family life. It causes a spirit of
isolation and loneliness. It creates a situation favorable to the dictator
who promises to correct it, if only the worker will surrender his freedom.
It behooves the people, therefore, to elect to office persons of prudence
and capacity in government, who will communicate a sense of social
integration and participation to the workers, without the requirement
of popular abdication of democratic rights and sovereignty.
The effect of Professor Simon's book is panoramic since it has compressed within a relatively short compass a great diversity of concepts.
This has necessitated the sacrifice of sustained exposition and leisurely
coherence. This may tend to restrict the popularity of the work beyond
the sphere of teachers of political philosophy and formal students of
that subject.
It may be that jurists would have preferred a chapter on the relation
of democracy to the legal order. The social sciences of politics and
economics have been ably explored from the points of view of history
and philosophy, but only incidental reference has been made to the
social science of the positive legal order. Yet, it is that order which
makes possible the successful operation of those institutional resistants
which protect democracy from the encroachments of dictators. Without
a well informed and well intentioned legislature to guide the legal ordel
constructively toward the goals of society envisaged by the book, and
4

Id. at 273, citing Genesis 1:28.
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without a strong, honest and independent judiciary to circumscribe legislative action by the inhibiting controls of objective natural law, the
most effective guarantee of continued implementation of the Founding
Fathers' democratic philosophy would disappear.
In conclusion this book is scholarly, mature, and conveys a most
important message. It is well written, compact and scholastic. It does
not mention natural law often, but its scholastic character is recognizable in its sense of balance and in its emphasis upon the social side
of man. It avoids the pitfalls of those post-Reformation political philosophies which stress the natural rights of the individual at the expense
of his social duties, and inflate the importance of the common man,
either individually or socially, so as to make him the ultimate judge
of right and wrong, good and evil. This work will take its place among
the other great books on the "eternal" subject of democratic government.
Brendan F. Brown*

UNDERMINING THE CONSTIrUTION. By Thomas James Norton.'
New York City: The Devin-Adair Company, 1950. Pp. xiv, 351. $3.00.
This book raises two very important questions which should be
seriously considered by all Americans. They are: what is the future
of our constitutional system of checks and balances, and what is the
future of our state governments?
This book takes what seems to be an extreme position under present
conditions and, no doubt, a majority of our people (judging by election
returns) will not now agree with it, just as the United States Supreme
Court has now taken opposite views. Nevertheless, it probably states
views of most lawyers of forty years ago and theories of constitutional
law generally taught in the law schools prior to the First World War.
The publication of this book'at this time serves a purpose similar to
that of dissenting opinions in our courts. It emphasizes the trend and
direction of our Federal Government and puts up warning signs which
may help to limit and control the present tendency toward centralization.
The sub-title of this book is A History of Lawless Government. Its
theme is that many acts and policies of our National Government
have been in violation of its constitutional powers and jurisdiction.
The author says in his preface: "During the last three decades nearly

Dean, School of Law, The Catholic University of America.
Member of the Bars of the Supreme Court of the United States, United
States Circuit Courts of Appeals for the 7th, Sth & 9th Circuits, and of the
supreme courts of several states.
*
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every restraint upon the man in power has been broken. Worse than
that, lawlessness provokes no reasoning objection." 2 He says: "The
writing of this book was impelled by the very manifest indifference of
the people of the United States to the constitutional doctrines of their
country." 3 The author makes a strong plea for citizens to learn more
about the Constitution and to insist on its study in the schools. He
contends that by failing to indoctrinate each new generation with a
knowledge of the superior philosophy of the American system of
government, "we thereby left the people weakened to attack. Hence,
so many of them are taken with the false promises of Communism." 4
He commends a recent law of the State of Missouri, enacted in 1947,5
requiring the teaching of the Constitution in all schools from the
seventh grade up, and in colleges, as a requirement for graduation.
The author does not limit his criticism to the administrations of
the last twenty years. He finds the first great departure from constitutional principles by the Federal Government to be the graduated
income tax law of 1913. He argues that the Sixteenth Amendment
does not authorize such a graduated tax and shows that it was one of
the measures advocated by Karl Marx and the Socialist Party. According to the author, "Plain lawlessness in taxation and a brutal attitude
toward the taxpayer were among the conditions that compelled the
writing of this book." 6 His view is that this tax has drained the states
of their resources and subjected them to bureaucratic domination and
that the Federal Government has been enabled to engage in many unconstitutional activities by limitless use of funds gathered by a
confiscatory income tax. He advocates that: 7
The States, by proposal in Congress or by action of their legislatures
under Article V, should amend the Constitution again by repealing the
Sixteenth Amendment and resuming police jurisdiction of the wealth of

their people, as they repealed the Eighteenth Amendment after becoming
convinced that they had made a mistake in giving to the Nation a burden

of police which it was not and could not be organized to carry .... The
States must return to the Constitution and resume control of their Union,
their property, and their prerogatives.
The next departures discussed are the Packers and Stockyards Act
of 1921 8 and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act of 1932. 9
The author argues that the Packers and Stockyards Act authorized
federal regulation of local industry and that the opinion of the Supreme
Preface at xii.
Id. atxi.
4 Id. at xiv.
2
3
5

Mo. REv. STAT.

c. 163, § 210 (1949).

6 Preface at xii.
7

Text at 75-6.

8 42 STAT. 159 (1921), 7 U.S.C. § 181 et seq. (1946).
9 47 STAT. 5 (1932), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1946).
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Court 10 upholding it as an exercise of the power to regulate interstate
commerce was contrary to previous decisions holding that such commerce ends upon delivery to the consignee. He says this was the
beginning of encroachment upon the jurisdiction reserved to the
states by the Tenth Amendment and was the precedent for greater
encroachment by the National Labor Relations Act." He also argues
that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation "was unconstitutionally
created and it has pursued an unconstitutional course," 12 in local
activities beyond the proper sphere of the Federal Government. He
says it has been followed by creating the Tennessee Valley Authority,
"a string of home loan banks and credit corporations and many other
corporations having not the remotest relation to the constitutional
functioning of the Government of the United States." 13 He maintains
that the functions of these corporations are not governmental, that
they usurp the police power of the states, compete with private business
and encroach upon the rights of citizens.
The author re-argues the views rejected by the United States
Supreme Court in upholding the National Labor Relations Act of
1935,14 the Social Security Act of 1935,15 the reduction of the gold
content of the dollar, the Bituminous Coal Act of 1935,16 the Housing
Act of 1937,17 and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.18 His
position is that: 19
The most common disregard by Congress and the President of the
Tenth Amendment, forbidding the Nation to usurp powers not granted
to it, and especially to stay away from the governmental field of the
States, has been in its persistent attempts, under the cloak of the Commerce
Clause and of the General Welfare Clause, to invade the police field of
the States - for the protection and care of the health, safety, morals,
education, and general well-being of the people - and take jurisdiction
of the liberties and living of men.
He agrees with Madison and Jefferson that the power of Congress under
the General Welfare Clause is limited to the eighteen clauses of
enumerated powers in Section 8, Article I of the Constitution. The
author's conclusion is that: 20
We have suffered a constitutional revolution without use of amendments
in accordance with Article V. That has come about through what
10 Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 42 S. Ct. 397, 66 L. Ed. 735 (1922).
11 49'STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1946).
12 Text at 103.
13 Id. at 108.
14 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed.
893 (1937).
15 49 STAT. 620 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1946).
16

49 STAT. 991 (1935).

17
18

50 STAT. 888 (1937), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (1946).
52 STAT. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1946).

19 Text at 161.
20 Id. at 193.
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Senator Thomas H. Benton of Missouri used to call "latitudinarian construction." That form of construction has been applied to the Commerce
Clause and the General Welfare Clause. No other clause in the Constitution, even with the gross twisting which the ardent "progressists" employ,
could be used by them in the framing of a bill for flouting the Tenth
Amendment, the great bulwark of the States.

He also contends that for over sixteen years, the White House has
been permitted to usurp direction and policy, 21 and that this has prevented the operation of the constitutional system of checks and balances
intended by the framers of the Constitution. He blames the states for
being more interested in "Federal aid," than in retaining their constitutional position and authority. He also blames the Supreme Court
for the increasing centralization of power in the Federal Government
because of its application of the Fourteenth Amendment permitting it
to interfere in the internal affairs of the states.
The author has an interesting chapter discussing a change in the
method of selecting the president. He maintains that the electors
appointed by the states should be replaced by political party nominating conventions dominated by members of Congress and other
office holders prohibited by the Constitution from being electors. He
believes that such domination by office holders and patronage seekers,
together with the system of popular vote for electors, causes misuse of
money in elections and encourages corrupt practices in elections and
in government. According to the author: 22
The tyranny of the Executive which Jefferson said would come "at a
remote period" is here. By the power of patronage, chiefly, and money
he has overcome the Legislative Department and reduced the Judicial
Department below respect.

His remedy is to go back to the methods of the early days of the
republic when electors were appointed by state legislatures recently
elected by the people. He thinks this would result in the selection
of a president and vice-president with highest qualifications who
would give the country a non-partisan administration.
In stating his views, the author does not mention and apparently
does not consider the change in our nation from a pioneer agricultural economy to an urban industrial economy. Nor does he mention
or consider garrison conditions brought about by world wars and
the menace of a great communistic dictatorship controlling much of
the earth's surface and population. With such great changes and new
conditions, our laws and our Government cannot be as unchanging as
the laws of the Medes and the Persians. Nevertheless, the author is
certainly right in his position that fundamental constitutional changes
should be made by amendment in the manner provided by the Con21
22

Id. at 179.
Id. at 284.
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stitution itself; and he is justified in designating intentional disregard
of constitutional limitations as "Lawless Government." Whether or
not one agrees with all of the author's views (and there is another
side to some of these questions), he has emphasized the grave problems
facing us from big government, a monstrous organism which tends to
become more and more removed from the people and their elected
representatives, yet seeks to control and run everything from the
National Capitol.
The author's essentials for preservation of constitutional government are stated as follows:

23

The three most important conclusions to be derived from this study
are these: 1. A Government erected by deep scholarship upon a Fundamental Law must fail without sufficient scholarship in the people who
choose its officers to sense instantly and resist courageously every proposal
to depart from its principles; and to operate as inoculation against notions,
foreign and domestic, for governmental paternalism'. 2. The States, which
insisted during the writing of the Constitution, and afterward by demanding a Bill of Rights, that their complete independence in all but
international and strictly national affairs should be respected forever,
must recover the constitutional position which, through the incompetence
of their representatives in Congress, they have too much given over to
Federal control. 3. As the Judiciary is the keystone of the American
arch, only the most experienced and capable legal scholars should be
appointed by the President to judicial seats; and it is the high constitutional duty of the Senate to refuse confirmation of appointments of any
other kind.

Although the author argues for some views of constitutional construction not likely ever to be re-established; nevertheless, every
thoughtful reader can join him in his final conclusion, stating Madison's
warning as follows: 24
"In framing a government which is to be administered by men, over
men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must enable the government
to control the governed; and, in the next place, oblige it to control itself."
That is the surpassing task confronting the American today - to compel
his Government to control itself.

Laurance M. Hyde*

JUSTICE ACCORDING To LAW. By Roscoe Pound.' New Haven: Yale
This fine book consists of
University Press, 1951. Pp. 98. $2.50. three lectures delivered by Dean Emeritus Roscoe Pound at Westminster College in 1950. The little volume is complete in ninety-one
pages.
Id. at 298-9.
24 Id. at 299.
* Chief Justice, Supreme Court
Chief Justices.
23

of Missouri;

Chairman,

Conference of

1 University Professor, Emeritus, Harvard University; Dean, School of Law,
University of California at Los Angeles.
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The question, What is Justice? is the title of Part I, the first lecture.
The author decides that it is something more than morality or natural
law. "For justice as we seek to administer it in the courts we must
take account of more than is given us by morals or by natural law." 2
Justice is a regime of social control. It is the end or purpose of social
control and so of law. Radbruch, called the foremost philosopher of
law, is quoted as defining justice as "'the ideal relation among men.' "3
Dean Pound prefers "an" ideal relation rather than "the" ideal relation
because the ideal has not yet been determined.
It is suggested that perhaps no more than a working idea 4 of justice
or an ideal relation can be arrived at. As Pound remarked,
Experience developed by reason and reason tested by experience have

taught us how to go far toward achieving a practical task of enabling
men to live together in politically organized communities in civilized
society with the guidance of a working idea even if that working idea is
not metaphysically or logically or ethically a convincing ideal.

This working idea is stated as follows: 5
What the law has been trying to do is to adjust relations and order
conduct so as to give the most effect to the whole scheme of expectations
of men in civilized society with a minimum of friction and waste.
This process is called by the author one of "social engineering." 6 In a
brief statement in the concluding paragraph of the chapter, justice is
defined as "an idea of a maximum satisfaction of human wants or
expectations." 7
The second lecture or Part II has for its theme, What is Law? The
word "law" came to be used to describe the "specialized social control
through the force of politically organized society." s Distinction is made
between "law" and "a law." By the latter is meant "a precept set
authoritatively by the law-making organ of the state." 9 It is pointed
out that one of the persistent problems of the science of law is whether
to emphasize ride or discretion.
It is said that there are three meanings given to the term "law"
by jurists: (1) the legal order; (2) the body of authoritative guides or
patterns of decision, whether judicial or administrative; and (3), the
judicial process and today, the administrative process. By the first
definition is meant a regime of social control; by the second, a body
of precepts; and by the third, the determination of disputes and con2 Text at 14.
3

Id. at 19.

4
5
6
7
8
9

Id. at 29.
Ibid.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 40.
Ibid.
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troversies. Combining the three ideas, we have "a regime which is a
highly specialized form of social control, carried on in accordance with
a body of authoritative precepts, applied in a judicial and in an
administrative process." 10
11
In the words of the author,
Law is more than an aggregate of laws. It is what makes laws living
instruments of justice. It is what enables courts to administer justice by
means of laws; to restrict them by reason where the lawmaker exceeds
his reason and to develop them to the full scope of the reason where the
lawmaker falls short of it.

The author's final statement of his definition of law is as follows: 12
"We must ever bear in mind that in law we have a taught tradition of
experience developed by reason and reason tested by experience." 12
This emphasizes law as made up of the three factors: taught tradition,
experience and reason.
The third lecture deals with Judicial Justice and raises the question
whether there can be a legal order according to law. Certain self-styled
realists maintain in challenge that the doctrine of the separation of
powers as set forth in the federal and state constitutions is outmoded
and that it should give way to the exigencies of administration in the
service state. But, the author avers, such realism, like that in art, is a
cult of the ugly. Recent examples of totalitarian states show us the
value of the separation of powers.
There should be judicial justice, administration of justice by judicial
specialists, as distinct from legislative and executive justice. In the latter
part of the nineteenth century, judicial justice was carried to the
extreme of committing matters of administration to the courts.
A reaction has resulted in the rapid development in this century
of administrative boards and agencies, so that the supposedly defunct
executive justice has been revived. It is true that administrative agencies
for promoting the general welfare have come to be a necessity and are
here to stay. But as Pound stated: 13
. . . conceding this we do not concede the further changes often urged on
behalf of administrative boards and agencies which would relieve them
from effective judicial scrutiny of their action to see that they keep
within their statutory powers, that they interpret and apply rightly the
law governing their action in a particular case, that they in reality and
not in pretence apply the standard committed to them, and that their
actions and proceedings conform to due process of law. Nor can we
concede that review when allowed for the purposes just set forth shall
be committed solely to administrative superiors or administrative courts.
10 Id. at 49-50.
11 Id. at 60.
12 Ibid.
13 Id. at 78.
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There may be a lack of checks in administrative justice. These agencies
do not always have taught tradition of experience developed by reason.
Judicial justice has the possibilities of certainty and flexibility. The
former arises because of training in precepts, the latter because of the
correction of the precepts through reason based upon experience.
There are certain checks upon judicial justice in the following of
known principles: criticism, permanent records and judicial reviews.
Finally, judicial justice has the advantage of independence of popular
excitement and clamor.
In conclusion the real foe of absolutism is law. Law presupposes a
judicial process based upon precepts, experience and reason.
As one would expeit, the volume is replete with learning. Its profound thought is earnestly recommended to those interested in jurisprudence.
Francis W. Johnston*

MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND. By Joel Francis Paschal.' Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1951. Pp. xii, 267. $4.00. - Author
Paschal's contribution is a volume which calls for careful reading and
thorough examination. This book, ostensibly a biography, contains but
little biography. Behind the facade of a life history the main part of
the book consists of thought-provoking discussions of two conflicting
theories of government. Juridical questions related to those theories
are presented by analyses and discussions of Supreme Court opinions
authored by Justice Sutherland. In some instances dissenting opinions
written by Justice Sutherland or other justices are also discussed.
These theories of government are: (a) that as little government as
possible suffices - only enough to insure that internal order and external respect and recognition are maintained; and (b), that active and
close supervision of the internal economy should be the policy, coupled
with an interest in the welfare of the individual citizens and the inevitable concomitant of minute regulation. Proponents of the first theory
object to intervention of the government in the economic activities of
its citizens and oppose minute governmental regulation.
Embraced in the second theory are the attractive ideas that government should so control internal economy that the standard of living
should be raised, the welfare of individual citizens being a matter of
national concern, and, of necessity, that the activities of individuals
*

Chief Justice, Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

1

Member of the North Carolina Bar.
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should be regulated in somewhat minute detail. The subject of this
biography was an able proponent of the first theory.
During the period of transition from the national policy based in
part on the first theory to the national policy carrying into effect the
second theory, Justice Sutherland was an able defender of the idea
that little government is the best. The author depicts him as deriving
his views from the philosophy of Herbert Spencer. Notable supporters
of that philosophy were Judges Cooley and Campbell, who were
professors at the law school of the University of Michigan where the
Justice received his legal training.
Following the great Depression of twenty-nine and the early thirties,
the second theory was espoused and supported by a large segment of
the population and, in a measure, it has displaced the ideas of Justice
Sutherland and other like-minded persons. Approximately fifteen years
have elapsed since the theory supported by Justice Sutherland was
discarded. At this time we do not know the effect, the disadvantages
or benefits of the present governmental policies. Nor can we accurately
foretell their result or their impact on our life as a nation. It may be
that this new policy will bring confusion and eventual catastrophe.
Notwithstanding the displacement of the idea that a small amount of
governmental interference in the affairs of citizens is the best policy,
it may be that the present attitude of our government will open the door
to a better and more improved system of government for mankind.
Only the lapse of time can answer that question and I venture no
prophecy. Justice Sutherland, as disclosed by Paschal, strove mightily
in judicial opinion against, what to him, were strange and unusual
theories calling for unheard-of federal activities.
The Justice's position is supported in a measure by the verdict of
history. But it is believed that he failed to accept a progressive and
benevolent view of the efforts of mankind to better their economic and
social condition. In the past few years, everywhere, leaders have been
thinking and acting to attain such result. Many governments now in
existence are making efforts to perform social service. Fifty years ago
no one would have thought that the Government of the United States
would, or should, show any interest in the living standards and welfare
of its individual citizens. Now this policy is accepted.
In the latter days of the Roman Republic and the first years of the
Empire, that government performed similar services for its citizens as
well as for denizens and clients residing in Italy. Some argue that this
action of the Roman government was the genesis of its decline and
eventual destruction. I offer no opinion on that subject. But history
does show that a people*enervated by luxury and misled by exaltation
of gross materialism cannot maintain a dominant place in the affairs of
mankind. An attitude of that kind is generally accompanied by one
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calling for the maximum of physical comfort and gratification of the
senses with minimum effort, which likewise hastens decline.
Justice Sutherland has been characterized as a great conservative.
It may be that he saw with prophetic vision the gradual decay of the
Government of this nation resulting from a similar process affecting
its individual citizens.
With all of this we indulge in theory. It suffices to say that Mr.
Justice Sutherland is an able discussion of the questions which have
been and are now perplexing the people of this nation.
It would be remissness on my part to give the book unstinted
praise, which I do not. It is to be observed that in many instances
issues and questions are stated in somewhat obscure language. In other
instances the argument lacks convincing force. But in view of the
many other excellent qualities of the book, such faults can well be
overlooked. I think that Mr. Justice Sutherland is a valuable contribution to the literature of the times and that it will aid in the solution
of many current questions and problems pertaining to government and
jurisprudence. At the risk of being somewhat repetitious I think that
the benefit and full flavor of the book cannot be attained nor enjoyed
by any person who reads it only once. It should be read carefully and
thoughtfully. The reader by so doing will derive lasting benefit.
W. T. Lovins*

THE LAW OF LABOR RELATIONS.

By Benjamin Werne. 1 New York:

Macmillan Company, 1951. Pp. xiv, 471. $5.75. - Brave is he who
attempts to set down in print the law of labor relations. The conflicting
decisions, the constant changes and rapid developments make the task
a fearful one.
Mr. Werne not only accepts the challenge, but does so for a most
commendable purpose - to indicate what is permitted, prohibited and
desirable under the statutes and decisions interpreting them. His hope
is that the book will be of practical use to those facing the intricate and
perplexing problems in labor law.
To that end he has divided the volume systematically into four
principal parts: Representation, Prevention of Unfair Labor Practices,
Rights and Duties of Management and Labor, and Collective Contracts. However, an examination of the component parts indicates the
*
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author has failed to achieve his expressed objectives; in fact, he has
deviated from them.
In his treatment of the legality of conduct prior to collective bargaining, the author has accumulated the summations of an infinite
number of judicial and administrative decisions. But there is little or
no effort to correlate the material into a comprehensive text.
In most instances he gives but a single sentence summary of a lone
decision without attempting to explain or to criticize or to compare with
interpretations of other tribunals. This digest method is of meager
value to one feverishly seeking an answer to a pressing legal problem
interwoven with economic and social implications. Possibly, its limited
function is to give the searcher a hint which he may use to refer to a
more complete and scholarly treatise.
His discussion of collective contracts is confined to what he considers
to be the proper objectives for management in bargaining with a union.
Methods are suggested as to-how to attain these goals. He is careful to
point out pitfalls employers should sedulously avoid. The superficial,
uncritical approach is followed as in previous sections. There are more
of the same brief, terse comments and opinions of the author. For
example, a supervisory employee clause which the author presents in
illustration is described as being unduly restrictive and inadequate to
"afford management reasonable latitude with sufficient definiteness." 2
The reader is asked to find the basis for this cryptic comment in a
second "preferable" clause which is given. Only by a word-for-word
comparison of the two can the reader fathom the criticism.
In the opinion of the reviewer, the author might have attained his
goal if he had been more objective in his treatment of the subject and
if he had accumulated less and had analyzed more.
Robert B. Vining*
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